It is widely known, Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 gave rise to further ‘territorial jurisdiction conundrum’.

In Bridgestone India, 2015 (13) SCALE 155 decided on 24.11.2015, “in order to overcome the legal position declared by Court in Dashrath,” attention was drawn to The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. A perusal of Section 1(2) thereof reveals, the Ordinance would be deemed to have come into force with effect from 15.06.2015.

It was held, “Section 142(2)(a), amended through The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia, in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection. Since the cheque, drawn on Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at IDBI Bank, Indore which intimated its dishonor to Appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by Appellant under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words “… as if that Sub-Section had been in force at all material times. ..” used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1), gives retrospectivity to the provision.”

____

Also see, Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Limited, [Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 526-527 of 2022] decided on 21.02.2023.

_____

Home Branch of payee is in Delhi. In case of an account payee cheque, governed by Section 142(2)(a), payee delivers cheque for collection in a Branch situated in Chennai. By legal fiction created in Explanation to Section 142(2)(a), jurisdiction would lie at Home Branch of payee in Delhi, irrespective of where cheque has been delivered.

Bridgestone India (P) Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 gave rise to a cleavage of opinion. This is evident from Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd., (2023) 19 SCC 404. Yogesh Upadhyay conveyed, jurisdiction must lie where primary action was performed, i.e., Branch where cheque was actually delivered for collection, is situated. Yogesh Upadhyay did not take into account Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) and is per incuriam.

– Hon’ble Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. M/s. HEG Ltd., [Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 1099 of 2025] decided on 28.11.2025.