“It is a well established position that when statutes are unambiguous, the Court must adopt plain and natural meaning irrespective of the consequences [Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711]. On a bare reading of Section 207 of The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 no other interpretation is possible. We hold that the […]Read more "Cloned Copy of Electronic Record"
“To read Section 36, prior to The 2015 Amendment Act, as inferring something negative, namely, that where the time for making an application under Section 34 has not expired and therefore, on such application being made within time, an automatic-stay ensues, is to read something into Section 36 which is not there at all. This […]Read more "Section 36 of The Arbitration Act"
Section 2(a) of The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 defines ‘child’ as a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age. A ‘child marriage’ means a marriage to which either of the contracting parties is a child. Hardev Singh […]Read more "Prohibition of Child Marriage"
“Where the Courts find that the words appear to have been accidentally omitted, or if adopting a construction deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply additional words but Courts should not easily read words which have not been expressly enacted. The Court should construct the provisions harmoniously having regard to […]Read more "Word Supply II"
“The rule of interpretation of Contra Proferentem has been pressed into service. As observed in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpalaya Printers, 2004 (3) SCC 694 : “It is also settled position in law that if there is any ambiguity or a term is capable of two possible interpretations, one beneficial to the insured […]Read more "The Contra Proferentem Rule V"
“Reliance is placed on Sri Nasiruddin, (1975) 2 SCC 671. Muhammed Ashraf, AIR 2009 KER 14 took support from the dictum in Holmes v. Bradfield Rural District Council, 1949 (1) All ER 381 and also in Sri Nasiruddin, (1975) 2 SCC 671 wherein this Court adopted ‘just, reasonable and sensible’ interpretation.” – Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, The Authorised […]Read more "The Revival of Ray XXIX"
It is, most often, not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there. But, where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication certain words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words. “In […]Read more "Word Supply I / The Revival of Ray XXVII"