“With effect from 01.09.2018, Section 143A was inserted in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by Amendment Act No. 20/2018. We are concerned only with applicability of said Section 143A to offences under Section 138, committed before insertion of said Section 143A.

Section 143A not only creates a new disability or an obligation but also exposes an accused to coercive methods of recovery of such interim compensation through the machinery of State as if the interim compensation represented arrears of land revenue. The coercive methods could also, as is evident from a provision like Section 183 of The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, in some cases result in arrest and detention of an accused. It must be stated that prior to insertion of Section 143A there was no provision on the statute book whereunder even before pronouncement of the guilt of an accused, or even before his conviction, he could be made to pay or deposit interim compensation.

In our view, applicability of Section 143A must be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences were committed after introduction of Section 143A, in order to force an accused to pay such interim compensation.

Section 148 depends upon existing machinery and principles already in existence and does not create any fresh disability of a nature similar to that created by Section 143A. Therefore, Surinder Singh Deswal, (2019) 8 SCALE 445 stands on a different footing.

In ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book.”

– Hon’ble Justice U.U. Lalit, G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana, [Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019].

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The remedy for failure to pay interim compensation as directed by Court is provided for by Legislature. The method and modality of recovery of interim compensation is clearly delineated by Legislature. It is a well known principle, if a statute prescribes a method or modality for exercise of power, by necessary implication, other methods of performance are not acceptable.

– Hon’ble Justice U.U. Lalit, Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha, [Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 2872 of 2022] decided on 02.08.2022.

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Section 143A(1) provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against accused, even before any adjudication is made on guilt. If ‘may’ is interpreted as ‘shall’, such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to well-settled concepts of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, Section 143A(1) may expose itself to vice of manifest arbitrariness. Considering drastic consequences of exercising power under Section 143A, ‘may’ used cannot be construed as ‘shall’. Section 143A(1) will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory.

– Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka, Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, [Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 2024] decided on 15.03.2024.

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Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 nowhere lays down, Directors or Authorised Signatories would come under ambit of ‘drawer’ for purposes of Section 143A. Authorized Signatory is not a ‘drawer’ of a cheque as established in N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663. High Court’s decision to interpret ‘drawer’ strictly as issuer of cheque, excluding Authorized Signatories, is well-founded.

– Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath, Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh, [Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 8849-8850 of 2023] decided on 24.07.2024.

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Also see, Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna, [Criminal Appeal No. 5556 of 2024] decided on 20.12.2024.