We accept view taken by High Courts of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Bombay, Kerala, Madras and view expressed by High Court at Calcutta. Section 29A(4) requires interpretation. It states, where Arbitral Award is not made within specified period of 12 months [Section 29A(1)] or extended period of 6 months [Section 29A(3)], mandate of Arbitral Tribunal will ‘terminate’. However, this provision does not apply if Court has extended time period, either before or after expiry of initial or extended term.

The word ‘terminate’ in Section 29A(4) makes an Arbitral Tribunal functus officio, but not in absolute terms. The true purport of the word ‘terminate’ must be understood. The absence of a full stop after the word ‘terminate’ is noteworthy. The word ‘terminate’ is followed by the connecting word ‘unless’.

We hold, an application for extension of time period for passing an Arbitral Award under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after expiry of 12 months or extended 6 months period. Court while adjudicating such extension applications will be guided by ‘sufficient cause’ and our observations.

– Hon’ble Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited, [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 23320 of 2023].

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The wording of Section 29A(4) and Rohan Builders clearly answer. An application for extension can be filed either before or after termination of Tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of statutory and extendable period. As per Section 29A(5), decision to extend time is an exercise of discretion by Court and must be done on ‘sufficient cause’ being shown and on such terms and conditions Court deems fit.

– Hon’ble Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, M/s. Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager, [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2272 of 2024] decided on 22.11.2024.

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We have no hesitation in holding, an interpretation based on a perception of ‘status’ or ‘hierarchy’ of Courts is opposed to fundamental conception of rule of law. We are of opinion, there will be no ‘hierarchical difficulties’, ‘conflict of power’ or ‘jurisdictional anomaly’ if a Civil Court entertains an application under Section 29A for extension of time of an Arbitral Tribunal, even if High Court under Section 11(6) has appointed an Arbitrator.

– Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, [Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 10944-10945 of 2025] decided on 29.01.2026.

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Privy Council in Alphamix Ltd. v. District Council of Rivière du Rempart (Mauritius), [2023] UKPC 20 upheld an Arbitral Award that had been annulled by Mauritian Courts on the basis that it was issued 3 days after the agreed deadline. Privy Council found, parties had tacitly and unequivocally agreed to permit the short delay, particularly in light of the Arbitrator’s illness and absence of objection from either party. By contrast, High Court in Ting Kang Chung John v. Teo Hee Lai Building Constructions Pte Ltd., 4 [2010] SGHC 20 set aside an Award that had been issued ‘well beyond’ the agreed deadline.

It is only when effect of an undue delay in delivery of an Arbitral Award is explicit and adversely reflects on findings, such delay, more so if it remains unexplained, can be construed to result in conflict with public policy of India [M/s. Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319]. We are of opinion, Section 29A must not be interpreted to infer a threshold bar for an application under Section 29A(5) for extension of mandate of an Arbitrator even when an Award is passed after expiry of the mandate.

– C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6551 of 2025] decided on 03.02.2026.