Thank You, Chief.

“Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I(I) 151 explains the meaning of ‘legitimate expectation’ in the following words: 

A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice.

The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person’s legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter.

The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for a grant.

Legitimate expectation as a concept has engaged the attention of this Court in several earlier decisions to which we shall presently refer. But before we do so we need only to say that the concept arises out of what may be described as a reasonable expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though the person who has such an expectation has no right in law to receive the benefit expected by him.

Any such expectation can arise from an ‘express promise’ or a ‘consistent course of practice or procedure’ which the person claiming the benefit may reasonably expect to continue. The question of redress which the person in whom the legitimate expectation arises can seek and the approach to be adopted while resolving a conflict between any such expectation, on the one hand, and a public policy in general public interest on the other, present distinct dimensions every time the plea of legitimate expectation is raised in a case. 

In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 one of the earlier cases on the subject this Court considered the question whether legitimate expectation of a citizen can by itself create a distinct enforceable right. Rejecting the argument that a mere reasonable and legitimate expectation can give rise to a distinct and enforceable right, this Court observed:

The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law.

Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant.

A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 499, where this Court summed up the legal position as under:

For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences.

A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense.

On examination of some of these important decisions it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words where a person’s legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest.

Therefore even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfill. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. But as discussed above a person who bases his claim on the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present.

The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the Courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which depends on several factors.

Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 727, where this Court held that a change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’. The choice of policy is for the decision-maker and not the Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. A claim based merely on legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right.

Similarly in Dr. Chanchal Goyal (Mrs.) v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485, this Court declined relief on the plea of legitimate expectation on the ground that the appellants had not shown as to how any act was done by the authorities which created an impression that the conditions attached to the original appointment order were waived.

No legitimate expectation could be, declared this Court, claimed on such unfounded impression especially when it was not clear as to who and what authority had created any such impression. The decisions of this Court in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381; Sethi Auto Service Station and Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 180; Confederation of Ex- servicemen Association v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 399; and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cements Ltd., (2010) 3 SCC 274, reiterate the legal position stated in the decisions earlier mentioned. In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2012) 11 SCC 1 this Court reviewed the case law on the subject and quoted with approval the following passage in Attorney General for New South Wales (1990) 64 Aus LJR 327:

To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be set the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords law.

This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.”

– Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Justice T.S. Thakur, Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, [Civil Appeal No. 3208 of 2015].