“The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018 amended Section 14. In the present case, we are not called upon to examine the effect of this amended provision.
The issue before this Court is whether Section 14(3)(c)(iii) is a bar to a suit by a developer for specific performance of a development agreement between himself and the owner of the property. The condition under Section 14(3)(c)(iii) is, the defendant has, by virtue of the agreement, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed. If the rule of literal interpretation is adopted to interpret Section 14(3)(c)(iii), it would lead to a situation where a suit for specific performance can only be instituted at the behest of the owner against a developer, denying the benefit of the provision to the developer despite an interest in the property having been created. This anomaly is created by the use of the words “the defendant has, by virtue of the agreement, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land” in Section 14(3)(c)(iii). Under a development agreement, an interest in the property may have been created in favour of the developer. If the developer is the plaintiff and the suit is against the owner, strictly applied, clause (iii) would require the defendant should have obtained possession under the agreement. In such a case if the developer files a suit for specific performance against the owner, and the owner is in possession of the land by virtue of a lawful title, the defendant (i.e. the owner) cannot be said to have obtained possession of the land by way of the agreement. This would lead to an anomalous situation where the condition in Section 14(3)(c)(iii) would not be fulfilled in the case of a suit by a developer. Application of the literal rule of interpretation to Section 14(3)(c)(iii), would lead to an absurdity and would be inconsistent with the intent of the Act.
By giving a purposive interpretation to Section 14(3)(c)(iii), the anomaly and absurdity created by the third condition will have no applicability in a situation where the developer who has an interest in the property, brings a suit for specific performance against the owner. The developer will have to satisfy the two conditions laid out in sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 14(3)(c), for the suit for specific performance to be maintainable against the owner. This will ensure, both owners and developers can avail of the remedy of specific performance under the Act. A suit for specific performance filed by the developer would then be maintainable. Whether specific performance should in the facts of a case be granted is a separate matter, bearing on the discretion of the Court.
The condition under Section 14(3)(c)(i) is, the building or other work described in the contract is sufficiently precise to enable the Court to determine the exact nature of the building or work. To examine the question as to whether the scope of the building or work described in the agreement is sufficiently defined, the Court needs to determine the exact nature of the work by referring to the relevant clauses of the agreement.
Another condition under Section 14(3)(c)(ii) is, the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is of such a nature, compensation in money for non-performance of the contract is not an adequate relief. The intent of the Section is to make a distinction between cases where a breach of an agreement can be remedied by means of compensation in terms of money and those cases where no other remedy other than specific performance will afford adequate relief.”
– Hon’ble Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Sushil Kumar Agarwal v. Meenakshi Sadhu, [Civil Appeal No. 1129 of 2012]